
Empirical Security & Privacy,



for Humans

UPenn CIS 7000-010 9/16/2025



The Cyberattack business

Readings



Systematically Understanding the Cyber Attack Business: A Survey

KEMAN HUANG, MICHAEL SIEGEL, and STUART MADNICK,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Cyber attacks are increasingly menacing businesses. Based on the literature review and publicly available reports, this article conducts an extensive and consistent survey of the services used by the cybercrime business, organized using the value chain perspective, to understand cyber attack in a systematic way. Understanding the specialization, commercialization, and cooperation for cyber attacks helps us to identify 24 key value-added activities and their relations. These can be offered "as a service" for use in a cyber attack. This framework helps to understand the cybercriminal service ecosystem and hacking innovations. Finally, a few examples are provided showing how this framework can help to build a more cyber immune system, like targeting cybercrime control-points and assigning defense responsibilities to encourage collaboration.

CCS Concepts: • Social and professional topics → Computing and business; Socio-technical systems; Computer crime; • Security and privacy → Social aspects of security and privacy; Systems security; Social network security and privacy;

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Cyber attack business, cyber crime, value chain model, cyber-crime-asa-service, hacking innovation, control point, sharing responsibility

ACM Reference format:

Keman Huang, Michael Siegel, and Stuart Madnick. 2018. Systematically Understanding the Cyber Attack Business: A Survey. ACM Comput. Surv. 51, 4, Article 70 (July 2018), 36 pages.

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1 INTRODUCTION

"Where there is commerce, there is also the risk for cybercrime" [131].

Cybercrime is a tremendous threat to today's digital society. It is estimated that the cost of cybercrime will grow from an annual sum of \$3 trillion in 2015 to \$6 trillion by the year 2021 [109]. Nearly one-third of companies are affected by cybercrime (32%). Indeed, 61% of CEOs are concerned with the state of the cyber security of their company [124]. It has become generally accepted that, "there are only two types of companies: those that have been hacked and those that

2022

2024

Google Online Security Blog:

Total rewards in 2024

70

Readings



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1 INTRODUCTION

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70

Cybercrime: Big \$\$

- Paper: "It is estimated that the cost of cybercrime will grow from an annual sum of \$3 trillion in 2015 to \$6 trillion in 2021" cited 2016 report by Cybersecurity Ventures
- Evolve Security blog post (written 2023?) agrees with those numbers, estimates \$20 trillion cost by 2026



The Global Cost of Cybercrime


(Source: FBI Internet Crime Report 2021).

The global cost of cybercrime was estimated to surpass \$8 trillion in 2022. The figure is expected to go beyond \$11 trillion in 2023. Statistics predict that cybercrime will cost the global economy more than 20 trillion U.S dollars by 2026, a 1.5 times increase compared to figures in 2022 (Source: Statista).

The cybercrime industry is growing year after year. In 2021, it caused global damages that costed \$6 trillion. The value is expected to grow by 15% annually over the next five years. By 2025, experts predict that the number will reach (and surpass) \$10.5 trillion, up from \$3 trillion in 2015 (Source: Cybersecurity Ventures).

Understanding cyber criminals


- Cybersecurity landscape has three main actors: victims (users), attackers, and defenders (cybersecurity product sellers)
- Grigg models victims and defenders, but ignores attackers (treated like "nature" in safety assessments)
- Hypothesis of Huang et al. paper: Understanding attackers and the business of cybercrime offers opportunities for better defense




Approach

- Survey the literature that reveals the various practices of the cybercrime business
- Develop a framework in which to categorize and group these practices: The cybercriminal value chain model
 - Vulnerability discovery, exploitation development & delivery, attack, and underlying supports
- Model an observed trend: Cybercrime is organized into services
 - Enables specialization, commercialization, and cooperation among actors with different skillsets
- All of this may reveal opportunities for disruption

Cybercriminal Value Chain Model




Cyberattack target selection rule




Cybercriminal service model


An application of "service science"



Smaller services can compose into larger ones, including with iteration-based refinement

Composition: Exploit kit development service





EaaS: Exploit as a service EPaaS: Exploit Package as a service DaaS: Deception as a service PLaaS: Payload as a service RPaaS: Repackage as a service SCaaS: Security Checker as a service OBaaS: Obfuscation as a service

Ukraine power grid attack

For example, in the Ukraine power grid cyber attack,

- the spear-fishing emails from DaaS (fake information),
- the exploit kit targeting vulnerabilities, ... from EPaaS (exploit kit),
- the KillDisk, a destructive data-wiping utility, and the SSH backdoor to maintain persistent access from PLaaS (payload),

were used in tandem to successfully break into the Ukrainian power grid system.


In the second step of the same attack, malicious firmware (from PLaaS) developed based on domain knowledge collected from the distribution management system,

which was tested by the **simulated power grid system (from SCaaS)**, was uploaded to the system and to attack the ICS components.

Status and typical pricing of cybercrime services

Service	Status	Pricing Model	Example Case	Estimated Price
EaaS	Existing	License	Exploit Trading [71]	up to more than \$250,000
		Subscription	Up-to-date Zero-day Exploits [151]	\$150,000 per month
PLaaS	Existing	Pay-per-install Commission	Payload Renting [10, 16]	\$0.02-0.10 per install 40%
DaaS	Existing	Subscription	Phishing Service [145]	\$85-\$115 per month 40%
		Commission	Fake Anti-virus [97]	
OBaaS	Existing	Subscription	Obfuscation Platform [50]	\$50-150 per month
SCaaS	Existing	Subscription	Scan4you [72]	\$25 per month
TRaaS	Existing	Pay-per-click	Traffic Redirection [50]	\$7-\$15 per 1,000 visitors
BNaaS	Existing	Subscription	Botnet Shops [145]	\$40 per month
BHaaS	Existing	Subscription	Cloud Bulletproof Servers [100]	\$300 per month
TAaaS	Existing	Subscription	DDoS Attack Service [134]	\$999 per month
REaaS	Existing	Pay-per-record	Reputation Escalation Markets [170]	\$0.4-0.7 per record
MPaaS	Existing	License	Market Framework [35]	\$4,500 per licence
		Commission	Marketplace [34]	2%-10%
MRaaS	Existing	License	Money Laundering Recruitment Package [99]	\$1,700 per licence
MLaaS	Existing	Commission	Money Laundering Service [127]	2%-30%
HTaaS	Existing	License	Hacker Training Courses [138]	\$250-\$800 per person
PPaaS	Evolving	License	Personal Profile Investigator [59]	\$4-\$20 per record
TPaaS	Evolving	Subscription	"One-stop-shop" Platform [2, 73]	\$4,000 per month
RaaS	Evolving	Subscription	Smart Contract [79]	/
HRaaS	Evolving	Subscription	Online Hacker Recruiting Market [105]	/
VDaaS	Emerging	Subscription	Bug Bounty Program [132]	\$542.04–\$1810.31 per vulnerability
TSaaS	Emerging	Subscription	Targets Ranking based on Value [101]	/
EPaaS,RPaaS	Emerging	Subscription	Repackaging Platform [143, 151]	\$4,000 per month
DMaaS	Emerging	Subscription	"How-to" Knowledge Systems [27]	1
VEaaS	Emerging	Subscription	Comparison "Shopping" Service [57]	1

Services are defined and explained in the following sections. Examples for existing services are actual, emerging, and evolving services are based on offensive versions of actual legitimate services. Prices listed here are intended to be representative of current prices and are constantly evolving.



Putting it all together: Multi-step attack as a service

Example Costs: Ransomware

To run a ransomware attack as a business, a cybercriminal can

- buy BNaaS (botnet) for \$999 per month,
- a traffic redirection protocol for \$600,
- six servers as a part of BHaaS (bulletproof server) for \$1,800 per month,
- access to the Neutrino exploit kit in EPaaS (exploit package) for \$4,000,
- a ransomware payload with customer support in PLaaS (payload) for \$3,000 and
- the traffic redirection service TRaaS to redirect victims to servers for \$600 per month.

To further increase the effectiveness of an attack, a cybercriminal can

- hire a qualified hacker from HRaaS for \$2,000 per month, and
- employ an obfuscation service from OBaaS to repackage the exploit kit and payload for \$600 per month.

Finally, to reduce risk of arrest, services to monetize benefits in the wake of a cyber attack as a part of **MLaaS** (money laundering) can be accessed for a fee of \$400 and 40% commission on processed funds.

Ransomware Benefits and ROI

Assume 30,000 people are redirected per day, of which 10% are victims of a ransomware attack where 0.5% of victims pay a \$300 ransom.

• Though only 450 victims (0.05% of total users redirected) will end up paying the ransom over a period of one month (30 days), this brings the cybercriminal's **monthly earnings to \$135,000**.


We can see that the **Return-On-Investment (ROI)**, even when only a small proportion of people end up paying a ransom, **is as high as 504.52%**, an impressive ROI for a business.

• The highest industrial ROI, which is from the Tobacco industry, is only 50.63% in August 2017

Discussion points

- General: What does all of this teach us?
- This paper was from 2016. What's happened in the meantime that might have changed things?
- How would we decide where is to disrupt this network, if we wanted to try?
- How do nation-state actors fit into this framework?
- What is the implication of "two way" services like vulnerability discovery training?
- Attacker motivations ("psychological") might sometimes differ from defenders (reduce loss). Ramifications?

Readings




Vulnerability Reward Program: 2024 in Review

March 7, 2025

Posted by Dirk Göhmann


In 2024, our Vulnerability Reward Program confirmed the ongoing value of engaging with the security research community to make Google and its products safer. This was evident as we awarded just shy of \$12 million to over 600 researchers based in countries around the globe across all of our programs.

Vulnerability Reward Program 2024 in Numbers




Bug bounty programs

Google has one, Microsoft too, and so does Amazon (via HackerOne)



2024 Google rewards

Much bigger than in 2013!





\$6.5M in 2019 for 461 researchers = \$14,100 per person \$11.8M in 2024 for 660 researchers = \$16,939 per person

In early 2013, \$1,000 - \$3,133.7 (max) paid per vulnerability per Finifter et al, "An Empirical Study of Vulnerability Rewards Programs," USENIX 2013.

An Empirical Study of Vulnerability Rewards Programs

Matthew Finifter, Devdatta Akhawe, and David Wagner University of California, Berkeley {finifter, devdatta, daw}@cs.berkeley.edu

Abstract

We perform an empirical study to better understand two well-known vulnerability rewards programs, or VRPs, which software vendors use to encourage community participation in finding and responsibly disclosing software vulnerabilities. The Chrome VRP has cost approximately \$580,000 over 3 years and has resulted in 501 bounties paid for the identification of security vulnerabilities. The Firefox VRP has cost approximately \$570,000 over the last 3 years and has yielded 190 bounties, 28% of Chrome's patched vulnerabilities appearing in security advisories over this period, and 24% of Firefox's, are the result of VRP contributions. Both programs appear economically efficient, comparing favorably to the cost of hiring full-time security researchers. The Chrome VRP features low expected payouts accompanied by high potential payouts, while the Firefox VRP features fixed payouts. Finding vulnerabilities for VRPs typically does not yield a salary comparable to a full-time job; the common case for recipients of rewards in either program is that they have received only one reward. Firefox has far more critical-severity vulnerabilities than Chrome, which we believe is attributable to an architectural difference

1 Introduction

Some software vendors pay security researchers for the responsible disclosure of a security vulnerability. Programs

costly zero-day disclosures. Monetary rewards provide an incentive for security researchers not to sell their research results to malicious actors in the underground economy or the gray world of vulnerability markets. Third, VRPs may make it more difficult for black hats to find vulnerabilities to exploit. Patching vulnerabilities found through a VRP increases the difficulty and therefore cost for malicious actors to find zero-days because the pool of latent vulnerabilities has been diminished. Additionally, experience gained from VRPs (and exploit bounties [23, 28]) can yield improvements to mitigation techniques and help identify other related vulnerabilities and sources of bugs. Finally, VRPs often engender goodwill amongst the community of security researchers. Taken together, VRPs provide an attractive tool for increasing product security

Despite their potential benefits, there is an active debate over the value and effectiveness of VRPs. A number of vendors, notably Microsoft, Adobe, and Oracle, do not maintain a VRP, with Microsoft arguing that VRPs do not represent the best return on investment on a perbug basis [26]. Further, it is also not clear if the bounties awarded are a sufficient attraction for security researchers motivated by money—underground economy prices for vulnerabilities are far higher than those offered by VRPs [20, 37].

Given the emergence of VRPs as a component of the secure development lifecycle and the debate over the effi-

Chrome

- 337 reports of unique, valid security bugs
- Awarded \$3.4 million to 137 Chrome VRP researchers
- So: ~\$10K per bug

	High-quality report with demonstration of RCE	High-quality report demonstrating controlled write	High-quality report of demonstrated memory corruption	Baseline
Sandbox escape / Memory corruption / RCE in a non- sandboxed process [1], [2]	Up to \$250,000	Up to \$90,000	Up to \$35,000	Up to \$25,000
Memory Corruption / RCE in a highly privileged process (e.g. GPU or network processes) [2]	Up to \$85,000	Up to \$70,000	Up to \$15,000	Up to \$10,000
Renderer RCE / memory corruption in a sandboxed process	Up to \$55,000	Up to \$50,000	Up to \$10,000	Up to \$7,000 [3]

Android and devices

Code execution reward amounts

Description	Maximum Reward
Pixel Titan M with Persistence, Zero click	Up to \$1,000,000
Pixel Titan M without Persistence, Zero click	Up to \$500,000
Local App to Pixel Titan M without Persistence	Up to \$300,000
Secure Element	Up to \$250,000
Trusted Execution Environment	Up to \$250,000
Kernel	Up to \$250,000
Privileged Process	Up to \$100,000

Data exfiltration reward amounts

Description	Maximum Reward
High value data secured by Pixel Titan M	Up to \$500,000
High value data secured by a Secure Element	Up to \$250,000

Bypass reward amounts


Description	Maximum Reward	
Lockscreen bypass [1]	Up to \$100,000	
Device Policy Controller bypass [2]	Up to \$75,000	

- Awarded over \$3.3 million total
- 8% decrease in the total submissions
- 2% increase in the number of critical and high vulnerabilities

Generative Al

- Prompt attacks
- Training Data Extraction
- Manipulating Models
- Adversarial Perturbation
- Model Theft / Exfiltration


 150 bug reports – over \$55,000 in rewards so far – with one-in-six leading to key improvements



Bugcrowd

- Bug bounties as a service (and other programs, too)
- Claimed benefits:





Return on investment?

- What is the calculation used to determine the benefits?
- What are the incentives to find and fix vulnerabilities in your systems
 - If you are a software provider
 - If you are a service provider
 - If you are a government agency



Worry: Hackers will sell your vulnerabilities on the dark web for more \$\$

Discussion points

- General takeaways?
- What can you glean from Google's results about their security?
 - How would you tell whether the program is really game-changing, i.e., significantly raising costs for attackers?
- Bug bounty programs:
 - When would you be motivated to start a bug bounty program?
 - Now that AI is becoming a big deal, how are these programs changing (or should change)?
 - How do these programs affect the attack ecosystem described in the other paper?
 - Concerns about how "security researchers" are compensated?